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INTRODUCTION
It may be a cliché to observe that campaign finance reform
has proved conclusively that the road to perdition is paved
with good intentions and that unforeseen consequences plague
the human condition.1 Perhaps all areas of the law are, to a
greater or lesser degree, evidence of these sad truths.2 Never‐
theless, our continuing quest for “clean” elections and cosmic
justice in the realm of campaign finance brings to mind Albert
Einstein’s reflections on insanity: “doing the same thing over
and over again and expecting different results.” Remarking on
the inability of years—actually decades—of reform to wring
“excess” money out of the process, Chief Justice John Roberts
declared that “[e]nough is enough.”3 Perhaps he is right.
Much of the problem with reform arises from constitutional
stumbling blocks. Although the Supreme Court’s guidance has
been rather fluid,4 the core of the problem has been the idea
that there is a constitutional distinction between the regulation
of expenditures and contributions.5 Restrictions on the latter
are often claimed to serve more directly the interest in avoiding
the apparent or actual quid pro quo corruption that the Court
has sometimes,6 but not always,7 claimed is the only justifica‐
1. See William P. Marshall, The Last Best Chance For Campaign Finance Reform, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 335, 342–45 (2000) (listing examples of unintended consequences of
reform: a decline in grassroots campaigning, the rise of “soft money” for “party
building,” issue ads, independent ads, and a substantial increase in the time that
must be devoted to fundraising and bundling).
2. See, e.g., Margaret Howard, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 31 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 451, 452 (2007) (in the context of amendments to bankruptcy law); see also
Nat’l Paint & Coatings Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1132 (7th Cir. 1995)
(“Time and again social science research teaches that laws fail to achieve their
goals—that the laws provoke costly adjustments that make the majority worse
off.”).
3. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 478 (2007).
4. See Richard L. Hasen, Justice Souter: Campaign Finance Law’s Emerging Egalitar‐
ian, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 169, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Court’s jurisprudence has swung
like a pendulum between periods of Court skepticism of campaign finance regula‐
tion and Court deference to congressional and state judgments about the need for
such regulation.”).
5. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771–72 (2008); WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 478–79;
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 20–23 (1976).
6. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773 (leveling opportunities for candidates of different
wealth is not a legitimate government objective); WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 479–80 (in‐
terest in combating “corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth” does not extend beyond campaign speech); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative
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tion for regulation. The Court has said restriction of the former
more substantially impairs First Amendment values because it
directly limits the message chosen by the speaker and his abil‐
ity to disseminate it.8
By permitting virtually no restrictions on expenditures by a
candidate9 and relatively robust regulation of contributions to a
candidate,10 the Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment
has created the modern phenomenon of the self‐funded mil‐
lionaire politician for whom public office is a prerogative of
family wealth or a nice coda to a successful business career.11 In
1972, General Motors heir Stewart Mott financed an experi‐
enced public servant, George McGovern.12 In 1992, H. Ross Pe‐
rot and Steve Forbes ran for public office themselves.
There has been more room for regulation of expenditures
on behalf of a candidate,13 but statutory interpretation,14 regu‐
Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985) (“[P]reventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compelling government
interests thus far identified for restricting campaign finances.”); Buckley, 424 U.S.
at 48–49 (the interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates does not
justify restricting campaign expenditures).
7. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 143 (2003); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990).
8. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
9. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 52 (striking down campaign and individual expendi‐
ture limits).
10. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 159–60 (2003) (upholding restrictions on
campaign contributions made by an advocacy corporation); Nixon v. Shrink Mo.
Gov’t Political Action Comm., 528 U.S. 377, 381–82 (2000) (upholding state cam‐
paign contribution limits); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 209–
10 (1982) (upholding restrictions on solicitations by a corporate Political Action
Committee (PAC)); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29 (upholding limitations on the amount of
contributions). But see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (contribution
limits set too low are insufficiently tailored to satisfy the First Amendment).
11. See Charles Krauthammer, The U.S. House Of Lords?, WASH. POST, Dec. 19,
2008, at A35.
12. Douglas Martin, Stewart R. Mott, Longtime Patron of Liberal and Offbeat Causes,
Dies at 70, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2008, at B6 (GM heir heavily bankrolled the cam‐
paigns of Eugene McCarthy and George McGovern). Mott later opposed efforts at
campaign finance regulation. Id.
13. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206–07 (2003) (upholding blackout pe‐
riod on independently financed ads that are the “functional equivalent” of ex‐
press advocacy for a candidate); Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 668–69 (1990) (upholding restriction on corporate expenditures
supporting a candidate); First Nat’l. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
788–92 (1978) (striking down restriction on corporate expenditures on referen‐
dum campaign); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38, 47 n.53 (upholding restriction on coor‐
dinated independent expenditures).
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latory omissions,15 and constitutional limitations16 have left room
for a brisk business in independent expenditures that, rather
than promote a favored candidate, criticize the positions of his
opponent. This structure has given us the current phenome‐
non of sepia‐toned advertisements urging us to call Senator
Foghorn and tell him to stop starving children17 and destroy‐
ing the Republic. Although negative campaigning is not a cur‐
rent phenomenon or the product of regulation,18 the modern
independent ad—attacking in the guise of attempting to per‐
suade—is certainly encouraged by regulation and the desire to
avoid its limitations.19
Regulatory responses have ensued, but money has proven to
be difficult to tame. What cannot be done through contribution
can be done with expenditure. Dollars that can no longer be
given to a candidate are given to a political party. Money that
cannot be contributed to a party is given to an independent or‐
14. See FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986) (adopt‐
ing same limiting construction for limitations on corporate and union expenditures);
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 43–44 (interpreting limitation on independent expenditures to
messages expressly advocating the election or defeat of a candidate).
15. One huge “loophole” has been the freedom of political organizations that
qualify under 26 U.S.C. § 527, that do not qualify as political committees, to en‐
gage in substantial and lightly regulated independent expenditures.
16. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449 (2007) (strik‐
ing down application of “blackout period” on independent expenditures for
“genuine issue ads”); MCFL, 479 U.S. at 263–64 (striking down restrictions on
express advocacy by an incorporated advocacy organization that did not accept
contributions from “for profit” corporations); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776–77 (striking
down restriction on corporate expenditures on referendum campaign).
17. Although they were apparently run by regulated political action commit‐
tees, during the 2008 presidential campaign, for example, Brave New PAC and
Democracy for America ran black and white photographs of a post‐operative John
McCain spliced with interviews of doctors discussing the recurrence of mela‐
noma. Brave New PAC, “John McCain is 72. He’s had cancer 4 times,”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DHvJPGnkQxE (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). A
group called OurCountryDeservesBetter PAC ran an ad featuring mug shots of
Weather Underground leader Bill Ayers and clips of Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s
less temperate sermons calling on Senator Obama and “his friends” to “keep the
change.” OurCountryDeservesBetter PAC, “Obama’s Ties to Ayers, Rev. Wright
and Kilpatrick,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDcQUcAjoeI (last visited
Oct. 14, 2009).
18. See DAVID MARK, GOING DIRTY: THE ART OF NEGATIVE CAMPAIGNING (2006);
KERWIN C. SWINT, MUDSLINGERS: THE TOP 25 NEGATIVE POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS OF
ALL TIME (2006).
19. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406–07 (2000) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that Buckley “has ‘given’ us covert speech” that “mocks the
First Amendment”).
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ganization. What cannot be done by a political committee is
done by a 527 or 501(c)(4) organization. Dollars that can no
longer be spent in one way simply flow to a new use.20 At least
one commentator21 has likened campaign finance reform to a
game of “Whac‐A‐Mole.”22
For this reason, the white whale for many Captain Ahabs of
the campaign finance reform movement has often been “effec‐
tive public financing.”23 The current system of public financ‐
ing for presidential elections has become largely irrelevant,24
as the fundraising prowess of George W. Bush and Barack
Obama far outstripped the amount of public funds available.
Given the effectiveness of bundling25 and of “microdonations”26
raised over the Internet, accepting public funding (and its at‐
tendant limitations on campaign expenditures) would leave
any publicly funded presidential campaign at a marked finan‐
cial disadvantage.27
20. See Marshall, supra note 1, at 342–45; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S.
Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1713 (1999)
(“Money, like water, will seek its own level.”).
21. Robert P. Beard, Whacking the Political Money “Mole” Without Whacking
Speech: Accounting for Congressional Self‐Dealing in Campaign Finance Reform After
Wisconsin Right to Life, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 731, 731.
22. Whac‐A‐Mole is an arcade game developed in the early seventies in which a
player accumulates points by striking moles—who periodically pop up from a
number of holes—with a mallet. One can apparently order “themed” games pro‐
viding players with an opportunity to strike emerging figures of the owner’s
choice. See, e.g., Bob’s Space Racers, http://www.bobsspaceracers.com/frames/in‐
dex/htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). The Author is unaware of whether a campaign
finance–themed game—populated with PACs, 527s, 501(c)(4)s, and famously self‐
financed presidential contender H. Ross Perot—has ever been made, but he
would love to see one.
23. See, e.g., Public Campaign Action Fund, http://www.publiccampaign.org.
24. Richard L. Hasen, More Supply, More Demand: The Changing Nature of
Campaign Financing for Presidential Primary Candidates 1 (Dec. 2008) (unpub‐
lished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267312.
25. ”Bundling” is a technique in which a candidate’s supporters solicit and
“bundle” contributions from friends and associates. See Marshall, supra note 1, at
344. The maximum individual contribution was increased from $1,000 to $2,000 in
2002 and indexed for inflation. 2 U.S.C. § 441(a). The current limit, according to
the FEC’s website, is $2,400. Federal Election Commission, Quick Answers–
General Questions, http://www.fec.gov/ans/answers_general.shtml (last visited
Nov. 23, 2009). The higher limit has raised the effectiveness of bundling.
26. Microdonations are generally described as those below $200, often raised in
increments over the Internet. See Hasen, supra note 24, at 15–16.
27. Id. at 3–5. Even candidates who initially pledge to accept public funding
have found it in their best interest to abandon the pledge. See Shailagh Murray &
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But the dream persists. Prominent organizations call for re‐
form of the presidential system28 and extension of public fi‐
nancing to legislative races.29 A number of states still employ—
or are currently seeking to adopt or reform—public financing
of elections.30 Often promoted under the rubric of “clean” or
“fair” elections, these systems generally involve the provision
of public funds to candidates who have raised some minimum
amount or aggregate number of private contributions.31 In re‐
turn for public funds, a candidate agrees to restrictions on fur‐
ther private contributions and expenditures. The idea is to re‐
duce the role of “Big Money”—or, for that matter, money in
general—in elections.
Recognizing the constitutional limitations on reform, state
public funding laws frequently provide “relief”—referred to
by names such as “reserve funds” and “fair fight funds”—to
publicly financed candidates running against a self‐financed
or privately financed candidate32 whose spending has ex‐
ceeded a trigger amount and to candidates who face inde‐

Perry Bacon Jr., Obama to Reject Public Funds for Election, WASH. POST, June 20,
2008, at A1. John McCain also announced that he would accept public funds for
the primaries, only to decline them later. Andy Sullivan, McCain says doesn’t
need public campaign cash, REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/
politicsNews/idUSN1118204820080212?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0.
28. For example, Common Cause is working with the Presidential Public Fi‐
nancing Reform Project, a coalition of reform groups including the League of
Women Voters, Public Citizens, Public Campaign, U.S. PIRG, and Democracy 21
attempting to reboot the current system. See Common Cause, Presidential Public
Financing, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&b=4773833
(last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
29. A joint report of the Brennan Center for Justice, Common Cause, Democracy
Matters, Public Citizen, Public Campaign, and U.S. PIRG calls for public financing
joined with “fair fight” funds to aid publicly financed candidates facing non–
public opposition spending in excess of certain levels. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUS‐
TICE ET AL., BREAKING FREE WITH FAIR ELECTIONS: A NEW DECLARATION OF INDE‐
PENDENCE FOR CONGRESS 6 (2007), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
content/resource/breaking_free_with_fair_elections/.
30. A summary of state public financing systems can be found on Common
Cause’s website, http://www.commoncause.org/site/pp.asp?c=dkLNK1MQIwG&
b=4773825 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
31. For example, North Carolina’s statute providing for the public funding of
judicial elections states that its purpose is “to protect the constitutional rights of
voters and candidates from the detrimental effects of increasingly large amounts
of money being raised and spent to influence the outcome of elections . . . .” N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 163‐278.61 (2008).
32. In other words, a candidate who opts out of public financing.
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pendent expenditures directed against them.33 This relief may
include permitting the “disadvantaged” candidate to raise
more money, providing matching state funds, or some combi‐
nation of the two.
This Article argues that the game of reform, having been the
victim of two major campaign finance decisions of the Roberts
Court, is over. The Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. FEC34
will prove to be fatal to most, if not all, asymmetrical public
financing schemes, and the Court’s treatment of expenditures
for issue advocacy announced in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life
(WRTL II)35 will leave most forms of independent expenditures
beyond effective limitation. The combination may render public
financing systems—at least as a device to reduce substantially
the influence of private money on elections—effectively futile.
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the evolution of the dis‐
tinction between expenditures and contributions and the various
rationales the Court has considered as potential justification for
regulation. Part II considers the degree of constitutional protec‐
tion now apparently enjoyed by independent expenditures for
issue advocacy after the Court’s decision in WRTL II. Part III
addresses the impact of Davis on the attempts to restrict or blunt
the impact of independent expenditures through asymmetrical
public financing systems. Most such systems cannot be recon‐
ciled with Davis’s suggestion that measures designed to
“counter” the constitutionally protected speech of one side of a
campaign are unconstitutional burdens upon that speech.
Part IV argues that this outcome is correct and suggests, in
Chief Justice Roberts’s words, that “enough is enough.” Al‐
though regulation to avoid actual or potential corruption re‐
mains essential, the Court’s recent decisions quite properly re‐
ject the restriction of speech in pursuit of “barometric”
equality, that is, the notion that contending candidates and in‐
terests ought not to be able to deploy financial resources that
are not proportionate to their public support ex ante. Rather
than trust elected officials to superintend the electoral process
in pursuit of some “pure” manifestation of democracy, it is bet‐
ter to allow broad public participation. We should understand
33. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16‐901.01 (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163‐
278.67 (2008).
34. 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2775 (2008).
35. 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).
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that contending factions enjoy different electoral advantages
and that allowing them to engage in relatively unfettered com‐
petition is preferable to management of the political process in
a futile—and unavoidably self‐interested—effort to eliminate
unfair advantages. Happily, technological advances may have
weakened the need for reform and validated the Madisonian
approach to the influence of “special” interests advocated here.
I.

SPEND IT YOURSELF: THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
EXPENDITURES AND CONTRIBUTIONS
A.

Origin of the Distinction

Our problem begins with the seminal case of Buckley v.
Valeo,36 which considered a constitutional challenge to certain
aspects of comprehensive federal campaign finance reform
passed in the wake of Watergate. Buckley considered the 1974
amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971
(FECA).37 FECA contained a number of provisions, including
limitations on contributions to a candidate and expenditures by
or on behalf of a campaign.
Buckley is a lengthy and complex decision addressing multi‐
ple statutory provisions. The judgment of the Court was ex‐
pressed in a per curiam opinion, parts of which were joined by
different groups of Justices. Full explication of the case is be‐
yond the scope—and need—of this Article.38 It is most impor‐
tant to note that the Court upheld certain limitations on contri‐
butions.39 A limitation upon the amount that can be contributed
to a candidate “entails only a marginal restriction” upon the
contributor’s expressive rights because a contribution commu‐
nicates only general support for a candidate and his views and

36. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
37. Id. at 6.
38. Buckley upheld public financing, disclosure requirements, and caps on indi‐
vidual contributions to campaigns. It struck down limits on expenditures by can‐
didates on their own behalf, limits for total expenditures by a campaign, caps on
independent expenditures, and certain provisions constituting the Federal Elec‐
tion Commission. See id. at 143.
39. FECA prohibited individuals from contributing more than $25,000 in a sin‐
gle year or more than $1,000 to a single candidate. Id. at 13.
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not “the underlying basis of that support.”40 Nor, the Court
concluded in Buckley, does the quantity of communication “in‐
crease perceptibly with the size of the contribution.”41 Contri‐
bution limits, moreover, more readily serve the state interest in
limiting “the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting
from large individual financial contributions.”42
FECA also placed limits on expenditures “relative to a
clearly identified candidate.”43 Before passing on their constitu‐
tional validity, the per curiam opinion, in an effort to avoid
problems of vagueness and overbreadth, construed this lan‐
guage to apply only to “expenditures for communications that
in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate for federal office.”44 The Court explained:
[T]he distinction between discussion of issues and candi‐
dates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may
often dissolve in practical application. Candidates, especially
incumbents, are intimately tied to public issues involving
legislative proposals and governmental actions. Not only do
candidates campaign on the basis of their positions on vari‐
ous public issues, but campaigns themselves generate issues
of public interest.45

In drawing this distinction, the Court said that determining
what constitutes “express advocacy” would turn on a finding
of what came to be called “magic” words such as “vote for,”
“elect,” or “support.”46
The Court upheld FECA’s reporting and disclosure require‐
ments with respect to its narrowed definition of “expendi‐
tures”—those expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate. It struck down, however, a cap on
the amount of such expenditures. In doing so, it argued that
limitations on expenditures do restrict communication (spend‐
ing money to disseminate a particular message of the speaker’s

40. Id. at 20–21. A subsequent opinion of the Court characterizes contributions
as “speech by proxy.” Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (Marshall,
J., plurality opinion).
41. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
42. Id. at 26–27.
43. Id. at 1.
44. Id. at 44.
45. Id. at 42.
46. Id. at 44 n.52.
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choosing does communicate more by spending more) in a way
that contribution limits do not. The Court observed that “[a]
restriction on the amount of money a person or group can
spend on political communication during a campaign necessar‐
ily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size
of the audience reached.”47
Moreover, independent expenditures, in the Court’s view,
did not “appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption
comparable to those identified with large campaign contribu‐
tions.”48 This reduced interest in preventing actual or apparent
corruption was insufficient to justify the more substantial bur‐
den on expression entailed in expenditure limits.49 Any broader
interest in equalizing the interests of competing interests was
“wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”50
Buckley’s distinction between expenditures and contributions
has been criticized by opponents and advocates of regulation
alike. Justice Thomas, for example, has argued that it is based
on a false distinction between actual and proxy speech.51
Whether one chooses to participate by expenditure or contribu‐
tion, there is “usually some go‐between that facilitates the dis‐
semination of the spender’s message—for instance, an advertis‐
ing agency or a television station” such that calling a
contribution “‘speech by proxy’ . . . does little to differentiate it
from an expenditure.”52 Nor is it correct in Justice Thomas’s
view to state that a contribution to a candidate does not consti‐
tute communication by the donor who, in contributing, en‐
dorses and facilitates a message (that of his candidate) that he
prefers.53 A larger contribution communicates “more” in the
same way as a larger expenditure.54 Buckley’s distinction be‐
47. Id. at 19.
48. Id. at 46.
49. Id. at 44. Ironically, given the Court’s own limiting construction, the Court
also noted that a limitation on independent expenditures would be underinclu‐
sive because expenditures for communications that avoided express advocacy
were left unregulated. See id. at 45.
50. Id. at 48–49.
51. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC., 528 U.S. 377, 413 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (quoting Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604,
638–39 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part)).
53. Id. at 414–15.
54. Id. at 419.
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tween expenditures and contributions, in his view, “ignores the
distinct role of candidate organizations as a means of individ‐
ual participation in the Nation’s civic dialogue.”55
Justice Thomas would leave little room for regulation. Justice
Stevens, on the other hand, believes that expenditure limits
should be allowed just as limits on contributions. Expenditure
limits simply enable speech and should be analyzed as time,
place, and manner restrictions.56 In his view:
After all, orderly debate is always more enlightening than a
shouting match that awards points on the basis of decibels
rather than reasons. Quantity limitations are commonplace
in any number of other contexts in which high‐value speech
occurs. Litigants in this Court pressing issues of the utmost
importance to the Nation are allowed only a fixed time for
oral debate and a maximum number of pages for written ar‐
gument. As listeners and as readers, judges need time to re‐
flect on the merits of an issue; repetitious arguments are dis‐
favored and are usually especially unpersuasive. Indeed,
experts in the art of advocacy agree that “lawyers go on for
too long, and when they do it doesn’t help their case.”57

Justice Stevens continues, “Congress is entitled to make the
judgment that voters deserve the same courtesy and the same
opportunity to reflect as judges; flooding the airwaves with
slogans and sound‐bites may well do more to obscure the is‐
sues than to enlighten listeners.”58 In his view, “the notion that
rules limiting the quantity of speech are just as offensive to the
First Amendment as rules limiting the content of speech is
plainly incorrect.”59
B.

Persistence of the Distinction

Nevertheless, the distinction between expenditures and con‐
tributions has proven relatively robust.60 In First National Bank

55. Id. at 417.
56. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2778 (2008).
57. Id. at 2779 (citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Academic criticism has also been robust. See, e.g., David Schultz, Revisiting
Buckley v. Valeo: Eviscerating the Line Between Candidate Contributions and Inde‐
pendent Expenditures, 14 J.L. & POL. 33, 35–36 (1998) (arguing for elimination of the
distinction).
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of Boston v. Bellotti,61 for example, the Court struck down a Mas‐
sachusetts statute prohibiting corporations from spending on
communications relating to referenda other than those that
“materially affect [the corporation’s] business, property, or as‐
sets.”62 The Court found no support for the proposition that
otherwise protected speech loses its protection because its
source is a corporation.63 Nonetheless, corporate restrictions on
contributions could still be valid. The Court in Bellotti distin‐
guished restrictions on corporate contributions as attempts to
prevent apparent or actual corruption, an interest not pre‐
sented by the referenda restriction.64 And, as we will see, re‐
strictions on corporate contributions have been upheld.65
In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee
(NCPAC),66 the Court struck down a restriction on expendi‐
tures by independent entities to further the election of a presi‐
dential candidate who had accepted public financing.67 In Colo‐
rado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (Colorado I),68
it struck down limits on political party expenditures for a gen‐
eral election campaign for Congress.69
The Court has, however, permitted restrictions on expendi‐
tures that constitute “express advocacy” in Buckley’s terms—at
least when undertaken by a corporation. In FEC v. Massachu‐
setts Citizens for Life (MCFL),70 the Court considered whether
section 441b’s prohibition against corporate use of treasury
funds “in connection” with a federal election71 could be consti‐
tutionally applied to the activities of MCFL.72 MCFL was a
nonprofit corporation that did not accept donations from busi‐
ness corporations, but raised money from its individual mem‐
bers and its activities such as raffles, garage and bake sales,

61. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
62. Id. at 767.
63. Id. at 784.
64. Id. at 787–88 & n.26.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 86–95.
66. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
67. Id. at 482–83.
68. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
69. Id. at 608.
70. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
71. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2006).
72. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241.
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picnics, and dances.73 The Court applied the same narrowing
construction to section 441b as it had to the prohibitions of in‐
dependent expenditures in Buckley, holding that it prohibited
only those expenditures that constitute “express advocacy.”74
Although MCFL’s activities did constitute express advo‐
cacy,75 a majority of the Court found that, as applied to MCFL,
section 441b unconstitutionally burdened MCFL’s right of free
expression.76 Although section 441b could be justified as a limit
on the capacity of corporate entities to use resources amassed
in the economic marketplace to provide an unfair advantage in
the political marketplace, application of the statute to MCFL
did not serve that interest because MCFL was formed strictly to
disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital.77 Its available
resources were not a function of its success in the economic
marketplace, but its popularity in the political marketplace.78
In short, the Court concluded that “MCFL is not the type of
‘traditional corporatio[n] organized for economic gain’ . . . that
has been the focus of regulation of corporate political activity”79
and announced an exception for what are now known as
MCFL corporations.80
The scope of MCFL’s constitutional limitation has not proven
to be particularly robust. For example, in Austin v. Michigan
State Chamber of Commerce,81 the Court upheld a Michigan stat‐
ute that prohibited corporate treasury funds from being used
for independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to,
73. Id. at 242.
74. Id. at 249.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 261.
77. Id. at 264.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 259.
80. Such an exempted organization, in the Court’s view, has three attributes.
First, “it was formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and
cannot engage in business activities.” Id. at 263–64. Because its funding is attracted
for political purposes, “[t]his ensures that political resources reflect political sup‐
port.” Id. at 264. Second, “it has no shareholders or other persons affiliated so as to
have a claim on its assets or earnings.” Id. Finally, it will not have been “estab‐
lished by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept
contributions from such entities.” Id. This restriction, the Court reasoned, “pre‐
vents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct spending
that creates a threat to the political marketplace.” Id.
81. 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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a candidate.82 The prohibition, the Court concluded, was nar‐
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.83 Although
the Chamber of Commerce was a nonprofit entity, it was not
formed for the purpose of political advocacy.84 Additionally, it
did not consist entirely of members supporting its political
purposes and accepted money from for‐profit corporations.85
Nevertheless, the narrowing construction of section 441b
contributed to the ability of interested parties to engage in in‐
dependent issue advocacy as long as they carefully avoided the
magic words of express advocacy. Thus, not only did expendi‐
tures by individuals and unincorporated associations fall
within the safe harbor, but so did ads run by, or with the con‐
tributions of, corporations and unions.
Restrictions on contributions have fared better. In FEC v. Na‐
tional Right to Work Committee,86 the Court upheld restrictions
on contributions by corporate political action committees or‐
ganized to make campaign contributions, relying on the special
advantages of the corporate form and the differing nature of
contributions both with respect to communicative impact and
the potential for corruption.87 In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov‐
ernment Political Action Committee,88 it upheld state limitations
on campaign contributions, notwithstanding that, in real terms,
the state restrictions were substantially lower than those ap‐
proved in Buckley.89 In doing so, it made clear that contribution
limits involving “‘significant interference’ with associational
rights,” need not survive strict scrutiny.90 Instead, the govern‐
ment need only show that the restriction was “closely drawn” to
match a “sufficiently important interest.”91 In FEC v. Colorado
Republican Federal Campaign Committee (Colorado II),92 it rejected a
facial challenge to limits on party expenditures coordinated with
a campaign, continuing Buckley’s view that coordinated expendi‐
82. Id. at 654–55.
83. Id. at 655.
84. Id. at 672 (Brennan, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 664 (majority opinion).
86. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
87. Id. at 209–11.
88. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
89. Id. at 396–98.
90. Id. at 387–88 (citation omitted).
91. Id. (citation omitted).
92. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).

No. 1]

Public Campaign Financing

297

tures are very much like contributions.93 In FEC v. Beaumont,94
the Court upheld prohibitions on corporate contributions, even
from nonprofit advocacy corporations similar to MCFL.95
C.

The Nature of Corruption: Setting Expenditures and
Contributions Apart

This persistent distinction—with expenditures constituting
express advocacy and contributions being subject to substantial
regulation, and other expenditures being relatively free, has
coexisted with substantial disagreements between the Court’s
regulatory proponents and regulatory skeptics regarding the
nature of the State’s interest in regulating campaign contribu‐
tions and expenditures. One perspective has suggested that
restrictions may only be based upon the interest in avoiding
actual or apparent corruption, understood as the undue influ‐
ence of individual donors upon individual candidates, that is,
quid pro quo or “play for pay” corruption. This view has
tended to prevail—or at least receive greater emphasis—in
cases involving regulation of expenditures.
The per curiam opinion in Buckley, for example, stated that
the only compelling interest supporting such regulations was
the prevention of actual or apparent corruption.96 It argued that
the “concept that government may restrict the speech of some
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voices of
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”97 In NCPAC,
the majority again claimed that “preventing corruption or the
appearance of corruption are the only legitimate and compel‐
ling interests thus far identified for restricting campaign fi‐
nances.”98 It defined corruption as elected officials being “in‐
fluenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money
into their campaigns.”99 Restrictions of independent expendi‐
tures do not serve that interest because “an exchange of political
favors for uncoordinated expenditures remains a hypothetical
93. Id. at 437.
94. 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
95. Id. at 149.
96. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1976).
97. Id. at 48–49.
98. FEC v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1985).
99. Id. at 497.
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possibility and nothing more.”100 The majority, quoting Buckley,
reasoned that “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordina‐
tion of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only
undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but
also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”101
That these communications might have an effect, the Court
concluded, is a matter to be embraced and not lamented:
The fact that candidates and elected officials may alter or re‐
affirm their own positions on issues in response to political
messages paid for by the PACs can hardly be called corrup‐
tion, for one of the essential features of democracy is the
presentation to the electorate of varying points of view.102

At the same time—in cases upholding regulation, often involv‐
ing contributions—the Court often has suggested an interest in
combating an expanded form of corruption. In MCFL, for ex‐
ample, the Court recognized that restrictions on corporate con‐
tributions and express advocacy might be justified by:
[T]he need to restrict “the influence of political war chests
funneled through the corporate form,” to “eliminate the ef‐
fect of aggregated wealth on federal elections,” to curb the
political influence of “those who exercise control over large
aggregations of capital,” and to regulate the “substantial ag‐
gregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages
which go with the corporate form of organization.”103

This interest in limiting what the majority called “the corrosive
influence of concentrated corporate wealth reflects the convic‐
tion that it is important to protect the integrity of the market‐
place of political ideas.”104
That rationale is, of course, broader than the type of quid pro
quo corruption emphasized in Buckley and NCPAC, suggesting
a legitimate state interest in counteracting the impact of un‐
equal financial resources in political campaigns. In Shrink Mis‐

100. Id. at 498.
101. Id. at 497 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47).
102. Id. at 498.
103. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (cita‐
tions omitted).
104. Id.
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souri, the Court again recognized a broader “corruption” con‐
cern:
In speaking of “improper influence” and “opportunities for
abuse” in addition to “quid pro quo arrangements,” we rec‐
ognized a concern not confined to bribery of public officials,
but extending to the broader threat from politicians too
compliant with the wishes of large contributors. These were
the obvious points behind our recognition that the Congress
could constitutionally address the power of money “to in‐
fluence governmental action” in ways less “blatant and spe‐
cific” than bribery.105

This interest was expressly rooted not only in actual threats,
but also in public perception.106 It involved both corporate con‐
tributions and individual donations.
This more expansive view of corruption is only partially con‐
cerned with corruption as commonly understood, that is, the
idea of improper influence. It suggests that money‐bought ac‐
cess—or widespread belief in its existence—can justify regula‐
tion. Beyond that, it seeks to address the disproportionate in‐
fluence of those with money to spend. As Justice Brennan put it
in MCFL, the concern is that “[d]irect corporate spending on
political activity raises the prospect that resources amassed in
the economic marketplace may be used to provide an unfair
advantage in the political marketplace.”107 The availability of
funds is—or ought to be—a “rough barometer of public sup‐
port,” but funds accumulated by a business corporation reflect
success in the economic rather than the political marketplace.108
This theory, with its emphasis on insulation of the political
marketplace from the disparities of wealth created in a market
economy, rests uneasily on the distinction between expendi‐
tures and contributions. Even if contributions do not raise the
same prospect of quid pro quo corruption, they permit the eco‐
nomic marketplace to influence the political process. They
105. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC., 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000) (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 28).
106. Id. at 388–89 (“Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of
the appearance of improper influence ‘is also critical . . . if confidence in the sys‐
tem of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent.”
(alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26–27) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
107. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 257.
108. Id. at 258.
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permit those with more money to speak louder. If the state ac‐
tually wishes to construct a more egalitarian system of cam‐
paign finance in the sense of divorcing—or at least distanc‐
ing—it from the distribution of private wealth, then its
objective is at war with the strong and robust constitutional
protection of expenditures.
II.
A.

WHACKING THE MOLE: EXPENDITURES SURVIVE
An Attempt to Limit Independent Expenditures

The result of Buckley’s distinction between contributions and
expenditures and between express and issue advocacy has
been a substantial movement of money to independent expen‐
ditures. During the 1998 election cycle, spending on issue ads
doubled to between $270 and $340 million and exceeded $500
million in 2000.109 Independent expenditures related to 527 or‐
ganizations exceeded $240 million in 2008, $198 million in 2006,
and $440 million in 2004.110 During the 2008 election cycle, in‐
dependent money shifted, to some extent, from 527 organiza‐
tions to 501(c) organizations.111 This move may have been pro‐
moted by more lenient disclosure requirements for the latter.112
Concern over the proliferation of these ads and the relative
lack of restrictions on the way in which they are financed ulti‐
mately led to passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
of 2002 (BCRA), popularly known as the McCain‐Feingold
Act.113 The pertinent part of BCRA prohibits electioneering
communications paid for with corporate or union treasury
funds within thirty days of a primary and sixty days of a gen‐
eral election for a federal office.114 Electioneering communica‐
tions are defined as any “broadcast, cable, or satellite commu‐

109. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 127 n.20 (2003).
110. OpenSecrets.org, 527s: Advocacy Group Spending in the 2010 Elections,
https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/index.php (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
111. The Campaign Finance Institute, Outside Soft Money Groups Approaching
$400 Million in Targeted 2008 Election, http://www.cfinst.org/pr/prRe
lease.aspx?ReleaseID=214 (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
112. See Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, To Conceal Donors, Some Political Groups Look to the
Tax Code, WASH. POST, April 17, 2007, at A19.
113. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–434 (2006).
114. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A).
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nication” that “refers to a clearly identified candidate for Fed‐
eral office” and that is “targeted to the relevant electorate.”115
This aspect of BCRA was upheld against a facial challenge in
McConnell v. FEC.116 Writing for a 5‐4 majority, Justices
O’Connor and Stevens explained that Buckley’s distinction be‐
tween express and issue advocacy was a matter of statutory
interpretation, not constitutional command.117 It was adopted
to cure the potentially fatal vagueness of FECA’s definition of
restricted expenditures “to include the use of money or other
assets ‘for the purpose of . . . influencing’ a federal election.”118
These vagueness concerns, in the view of the Court, are not
present in the more specific definition of prohibited communi‐
cations in BCRA.119 All ads mentioning a candidate are prohib‐
ited during the blackout period.
Although the Court declined to abandon Buckley’s differing
approaches to contributions and expenditures,120 a majority re‐
jected the idea that “the First Amendment requires Congress to
treat so‐called issue advocacy differently from express advo‐
cacy.”121 The majority rejected the idea that the First Amend‐
ment erects a rigid barrier between restriction of express advo‐
cacy and of issue advocacy. Regulation of the former was
necessary to serve Congress’s goal to combat real or apparent
corruption. The distinction between the presence or absence of
Buckley’s “magic words” was “functionally meaningless.”122
There is “[l]ittle difference,” the majority stated, “between an
ad that urged viewers to ‘vote against Jane Doe’ and one that
condemned Jane Doe’s record on a particular issue before ex‐
horting viewers to ‘call Jane Doe and tell her what you
think.’”123 In fact, some campaign professionals claim that the
most effective ads avoid the use of magic words.124

115. Id.
116. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
117. Id. at 190.
118. Id. at 191 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 77 (1976)).
119. Id. at 194.
120. Id. at 137–38.
121. Id. at 194.
122. Id. at 193.
123. Id. at 126–27. The Court noted that very few candidate ads contained words
of express advocacy. Id. at 127 n.18.
124. Id. at 193 n.77.
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The ads may have been functionally equivalent, but the
methods by which they were financed were not:
Corporations and unions spent hundreds of millions of dol‐
lars of their general funds to pay for these ads, and those ex‐
penditures, like soft‐money donations to the political par‐
ties, were unregulated under FECA. Indeed, the ads were
attractive to organizations and candidates precisely because
they were beyond FECA’s reach, enabling candidates and
their parties to work closely with friendly interest groups to
sponsor so‐called issue ads when the candidates themselves
were running out of money.125

The ads, moreover, are usually run by groups with bland and
mysterious names, often falsely suggesting a grassroots prove‐
nance.126 Voters may be unlikely to know who sponsored them.127
The Court observed that political candidates and parties
would ask those who had donated their permitted quota of
hard money to contribute additional funds for issue advo‐
cacy.128 In the pre‐BCRA world, such candidates and parties
“knew who their friends were.”129 Requiring words of express
advocacy, in the view of the majority, created a massive oppor‐
tunity for evasion that Congress chose to address through the
BCRA’s blackout period for electioneering communication fi‐
nanced by corporate and union treasury funds.
Once again, the Court recognized a state interest in combat‐
ing a broader form of corruption so as to diminish the political
influence of wealth.130 The prohibition against use of corporate
and union treasury funds was justified by Congress’s interest
in restraining “‘the corrosive and distorting effects of immense
aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of
the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the
public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.’”131
This holding has—or, at least for a brief period of time,
had—two implications for the future of issue advertising. The
125. Id. at 127–28 (citations omitted).
126. See id. at 128.
127. See id. at 205.
128. Id. at 129.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 205.
131. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990)).
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interest in avoiding the fact or appearance of corruption justi‐
fies the restriction of communications that may have the effect
of aiding a candidate even in the absence of any connection or
coordination with the candidate, or words of express advocacy.
Although a majority retained the distinction between expendi‐
tures and contributions, expenditures could be restricted in
support of limitations on contributions.
In addition, as in MCFL and Austin, a majority once again
held that restricting the advantages in amassing resources sup‐
posedly enjoyed by corporations justifies restriction on corpo‐
rate speech. It suggested, moreover, a related interest in equal‐
izing resources in political campaigns—in achieving what Rick
Hasen, borrowing from Justice Brennan in MCFL, calls baro‐
metric equality—the notion that financial support should
roughly reflect popular support.132 Although raised in the con‐
text of corporations and unions, McConnell suggested again
that the state has an interest in ensuring, at least, some relation‐
ship between financial and popular support.
McConnell itself did not end or even diminish issue adver‐
tisements. Regulatory gaps and legal ingenuity enabled con‐
tinued growth in independent expenditures.133 These could still
be financed by individuals and certain groups, such as 527 or‐
ganizations, which continued to be outside most federal statu‐
tory restrictions. Money found a way.
Yet the path to greater restriction seemed clear. The breadth of
the McConnell rationale encompassed not only the capacity of
corporations and unions to amass large amounts of wealth, but a
broader notion of the anticorruption rationale. It suggested that
many of the remaining legislative lacunae could be readily
closed and issue advertising could be substantially restricted.
B.

The Protection of Issue Advocacy

But not for long. In Wisconsin Right to Life, a nonprofit pro‐
life organization sought to run ads during the blackout period
addressing the filibuster of Bush administration judicial nomi‐

132. See Richard L. Hasen, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING
EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 111–12 (2003).
133. See supra text accompanying notes 20–22.
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nees.134 The ads in question were fairly standard representa‐
tions of the genre. They called upon Wisconsin Senators Kohl
and Feingold to support up or down votes on President Bush’s
judicial nominees.135 Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL) wished to
run the ads during the blackout period preceding Senator Fein‐
gold’s bid for reelection.136 It wished to use general treasury
funds to pay for the ads and admitted that these funds in‐
cluded some from corporate donors.
The matter came to the Court twice. In FEC v. Wisconsin Right
to Life (WRTL I),137 the Court held that McConnell did not fore‐
close “as applied” challenges to BCRA.138 One year later, in
WRTL II, the Court upheld Wisconsin Right to Life’s “as ap‐
plied” challenge, splitting three ways.139 Justices Scalia, Ken‐
nedy, and Thomas, who dissented in McConnell, reiterated
their belief that the blackout provision was either unconstitu‐
tionally vague or facially unconstitutional.140 Justices Souter,
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, all of whom (with Justice
O’Connor) were in the McConnell majority, would have upheld
application of the blackout provision to the ads in question.141
134. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 458–59. One of the
ads, called “Wedding,” featured a bride and groom at the altar:
Pastor: And who gives this woman to be married to this man?
Bride’s Father: Well, as father of the bride, I certainly could. But instead,
I’d like to share a few tips on how to properly install drywall. Now you
put the drywall up . . .
Voice–Over: Sometimes it’s just not fair to delay an important decision.
But in Washington it’s happening. A group of Senators is using the
filibuster delay tactic to block federal judicial nominees from a simple
‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. So qualified candidates don’t get a chance to serve.
It’s politics at work, causing gridlock and backing up some of our courts
to a state of emergency.
Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster.
Visit: BeFair.org
Paid for by Wisconsin Right to Life (befair.org), which is responsible for
the content of this advertising and not authorized by any candidate or
candidate’s committee.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The text of the other two WRTL advertise‐
ments was similar. See id. at 459.
135. Id. at 459.
136. Id. at 460.
137. 546 U.S. 410 (2005).
138. Id. at 412.
139. WRTL II, 551 U.S. 449.
140. Id. at 483–84 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
141. Id. at 504 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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The two new members of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, agreed in a “principal opinion” (written by Chief
Justice Roberts) that WRTL and its corporate donors have a
First Amendment right to communicate on issues of interest—
even during the election and even if they name a candidate for
federal office.142 Restriction of this right cannot, in the absence
of coordination with the candidate, be justified by the interest
in avoiding actual or apparent impropriety. The principal opin‐
ion nevertheless purported to follow McConnell’s holding that
the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy may be re‐
stricted,143 but it adopted an extraordinarily generous definition
of “genuine issue advocacy.”144
In order to protect “the liberty to discuss publicly and truth‐
fully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or
fear of subsequent punishment,”145 the principal opinion ar‐
gued that the test for express advocacy or its functional equiva‐
lent “must be objective, focusing on the substance of the com‐
munication rather than on amorphous considerations of intent
and effect.”146 Therefore, neither the intent nor the effect (in the
sense of examining whether an ad actually influences—or is
likely to influence—votes) is relevant. Thus, the principal opin‐
ion held that BCRA’s blackout provisions can only be applied
to ads that are “susceptible [to] no reasonable interpretation
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candi‐
date.”147 In other words, if a communication can reasonably be
called an issue ad, then it is an issue ad.
Although one could imagine an inquiry into the nature of an
ad that is highly contextualized and driven by the role played
by that ad in the particular race, the principal opinion made
clear that WRTL II was not that case.148 Because the possibility
of a lengthy, indeterminate, and necessarily subjective inquiry
would chill speech, the inquiry into whether an ad cannot be
construed as an issue ad must be objective and straight‐
142. Id. at 481–82.
143. Id. at 457.
144. Id. at 469–70.
145. Id. at 469 (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776 (1978)).
146. Id. at 469.
147. Id. at 469–70 (emphasis added).
148. See id. at 469.
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forward in a way that will minimize uncertainty and that will
not deter protected speech.149 Because the “benefit of the
doubt” ought to go to “speech, not censorship,”150 this inquiry
must not be overly concerned with context, and the determina‐
tion should involve little, if any, discovery.151 Thus, the debate
over whether something is a “phony” or “genuine” issue ad is
reduced to whether it discusses . . . issues.
The Court agreed that “the distinction between discussion of
issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of
candidates may often dissolve in practical application.152 But,
unlike the Court in McConnell, the Court in WRTL II held that
such a tendency “is not enough to establish that the ads can
only reasonably be viewed as advocating or opposing a candi‐
date in a federal election.”153 “Discussion of issues,” it contin‐
ued, “cannot be suppressed simply because the issues may also
be pertinent in an election. Where the First Amendment is im‐
plicated, the tie goes to the speaker.”154
The Court had little difficulty finding that WRTL ads were
genuine issue advertising:
Under this test, WRTL’s three ads are plainly not the func‐
tional equivalent of express advocacy. First, their content is
consistent with that of a genuine issue ad: The ads focus on a
legislative issue, take a position on the issue, exhort the pub‐
lic to adopt that position, and urge the public to contact pub‐
lic officials with respect to the matter. Second, their content
lacks indicia of express advocacy: The ads do not mention an
election, candidacy, political party, or challenger; and they
do not take a position on a candidate’s character, qualifica‐
tions, or fitness for office.155

That WRTL and its PAC opposed Senator Feingold’s reelec‐
tion, in the Court’s view, went only to its subjective intent and
was therefore irrelevant. Nor did it matter that the ad ran near

149. See id. at 468–69.
150. Id. at 452.
151. Id. at 469.
152. Id. at 474 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976)). The majority in
McConnell thought them “functionally identical in important respects.” McCon‐
nell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126 (2003).
153. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 474.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 470.
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an election but after the Senate had recessed.156 An issue ad
might reasonably be run when a legislator is back home or “to
coincide with public interest rather than a floor vote.”157 The ad’s
direction of viewers to a website that set forth the Senators’ posi‐
tions on judicial filibusters and allowed visitors to sign up for
“‘e‐alerts,’ some of which contained exhortations to vote against
Senator Feingold,”158 also did not impress the Court.
Regulation of issue ads could not, in the view of the principal
opinion, be justified by the state’s interest in preventing actual
or apparent corruption or in promoting a more “egalitarian”
system of campaign finance:
This Court has long recognized “the governmental interest in
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption” in
election campaigns. This interest has been invoked as a reason
for upholding contribution limits. As Buckley explained, “[t]o
the extent that large contributions are given to secure a politi‐
cal quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the
integrity of our system of representative democracy is un‐
dermined.” We have suggested that this interest might also
justify limits on electioneering expenditures because it may be
that, in some circumstances, “large independent expenditures
pose the same dangers of actual or apparent quid pro quo ar‐
rangements as do large contributions.”159

The majority rejected the interest in combating a broader
form of corruption and minimizing the influence of corporate
wealth relied upon in Austin and McConnell.160 Specifically,
the corruption represented by “the corrosive and distorting
effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumu‐
lated with the help of the corporate form” was not enough to
trump First Amendment rights.161 This “different type of cor‐
ruption,” he said, does not apply outside the scope of cam‐
paign speech and “genuine issue ads” (as WRTL II defines
them) are not that.162

156. Id. at 472.
157. Id. at 472–73.
158. Id. at 473.
159. Id. at 478 (citation omitted).
160. Id. at 479.
161. Id. (quoting Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660
(1990)).
162. Id. at 480.
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McConnell arguably applied this interest—which this Court
had only assumed could justify regulation of express advo‐
cacy—to ads that were the “functional equivalent” of ex‐
press advocacy. But to justify regulation of WRTL’s ads, this
interest must be stretched yet another step to ads that are not
the functional equivalent of express advocacy. Enough is
enough.163

“Issue ads like WRTL’s,” according to Chief Justice Roberts,
“are by no means equivalent to contributions, and the quid pro
quo corruption interest cannot justify regulating them. To
equate WRTL’s ads with contributions is to ignore their value
as political speech.”164
Finally, the principal opinion declined to continue the game
of “Whac‐A‐Mole.” It rejected the idea that “an expansive defi‐
nition of ‘functional equivalent’ is needed to ensure that issue
advocacy does not circumvent the rule against express advo‐
cacy, which in turn helps protect against circumvention of the
rule against contributions.”165 This “prophylaxis upon prophy‐
laxis” approach is inconsistent with strict scrutiny.166 That
WRTL had the option of forming a PAC could not justify the
restriction of any speech other than express advocacy or its
functional equivalent.167
The dissent raised again the theme of the need to counter the
political impact of “concentrations of money in self‐interested
hands” that “threatens the capacity of this democracy to repre‐
sent its constituents and the confidence of its citizens in their
capacity to govern themselves.”168 These interests, critical in
MCFL, Austin and McConnell, justify, as opposed to a laissez
faire approach to the electoral process, “clear and reasonable
boundaries . . . to limit ‘the corrosive and distorting effects of
immense aggregations of wealth.’”169 The principal opinion,
they argued, left little room for these boundaries:
[I]t is hard to imagine the Chief Justice would ever find an
ad to be “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
163. Id. at 478 (citation omitted).
164. Id. at 478–79.
165. Id. at 479.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 477 n.9.
168. Id. at 507 (Souter, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 535 (citation omitted).
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than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,”
unless it contained words of express advocacy. The Chief
Justice thus effectively reinstates the same toothless “magic
words” criterion of regulable electioneering that led Con‐
gress to enact BCRA in the first place.170

There was, in the view of the four dissenting justices, no way
that the hypothetical “Jane Doe ad,” regarded as the “func‐
tional equivalence” of express advocacy in McConnell, would
not be considered genuine issue advocacy under the test
adopted by the principal opinion in WRTL II.171 The three con‐
curring justices agreed.172 To the dissent, McConnell had been
“invert[ed].”173 “[W]e meant,” they said, “that an issue ad with‐
out campaign advocacy could escape the restriction.”174 The
principal opinion, however, “wrings the opposite conclusion”
from McConnell stating that if there is any way to characterize
an ad as issue advocacy, it is free from restriction.175
1.

The Continued Viability of Issue Ads

WRTL II has two implications that are important here. It af‐
firms the continued viability of the now over thirty‐year‐old
distinction between expenditures and contributions. The latter
can be restricted to avoid actual or apparent corruption, but the
former—even if candidates are able to know who their friends
are—cannot. And while the Court does not explicitly return to
the regime of magic words, it should not be difficult for adver‐
tisers to frame election cycle communications as “genuine issue
advocacy.” As a consequence, the market for issue ads is likely
to remain robust. As the WRTL II dissent176 and a number of
170. Id. at 531.
171. Id. at 525–27.
172. Id. at 498 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring). One is tempted to observe that any
proposition of law agreed upon by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, Stevens,
Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg may well be taken as conclusively proven.
173. Id. at 526 (Souter, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
175. Id. Although it seems indisputable that the WRTL II principal opinion is in‐
consistent with McConnell, it is less clear that it “inverts” it. It does not suggest, for
example, that only campaign ads without issue content are subject to restriction or
even that any issue content will immunize an ad from restriction.
176. Id. at 536 (“After today, the ban on contributions by corporations and un‐
ions and the limitation on their corrosive spending when they enter the political
arena are open to easy circumvention, and the possibilities for regulating corpo‐
rate and union campaign money are unclear.”).
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commentators have noted,177 WRTL II creates a rather large safe
harbor for independent expenditures mentioning candidates
but purporting to focus on issues.
FEC regulations seeking to implement WRTL II do not suggest
otherwise. After setting forth the test from the principal opinion,
that is, that corporations and labor organizations are prohibited
from making electioneering communications only if “the com‐
munication is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified Fed‐
eral candidate,”178 the rules provide for a safe harbor. In perti‐
nent part, a communication will fall within the safe harbor if it:
[d]oes not mention any election, candidacy, political party,
opposing candidate, or voting by the general public; [d]oes
not take a position on any candidate’s or officeholder’s char‐
acter, qualifications, or fitness for office [and] [f]ocuses on a
legislative, executive or judicial matter or issue [while it]
[u]rges a candidate to take a particular position or action
with respect to the matter or issue, or [u]rges the public to
adopt a particular position and to contact the candidate with
respect to the matter or issue; or [p]roposes a commercial
transaction, such as the purchase of . . . a product or service,
or attendance (for a fee) at a film exhibition or other event.179
177. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, First Amendment Basics Redux: Buckley v. Valeo to
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 2006–2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 77, 99; Richard L.
Hasen, Beyond Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wiscon‐
sin Right to Life, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1064, 1089 (2008) (“Rather than most election‐
eering communications being subject to section 203, WRTL II mandates that most
such communications be exempted from section 203.”); Frances R. Hill, Exempt
Organizations in the 2008 Election: Will Wisconsin Right to Life Bring Changes?, 19 U.
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271, 286 (2008); Matthew Modell, Protecting Free Speech in
Electioneering Communications: FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
ON. 30, 44–45 (2007), (“The WRTL ruling essentially brings us back to a ‘magic
words’ test.”); cf. Margaret G. Perl and Kimberly A. Demarchi, Direct Democracy
and Indirect Regulation: The Brewing Conflict Between Federal Campaign Finance Law
and State Ballot Measure Campaigns, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 591, 624 (2008)
(“WRTL has arguably removed most of the restrictions that BCRA’s electioneering
communications provisions placed on ballot measure committee advertisements
featuring a federal candidate.”). But see Paul S. Ryan, Wisconsin Right to Life and
the Resurrection of Furgatch, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 130, 159 (2008) (arguing that
WRTL II should not be read to require magic words, but to say that an ad is the
functional equivalent of express advocacy “when read as a whole, and with lim‐
ited reference to external events, [it is] susceptible of no other reasonable interpre‐
tation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate” (quoting
FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1987))).
178. 11 C.F.R. § 114.15(a) (2009).
179. 11 C.F.R. § 114.15(b).
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But even an ad outside this relatively deep safe harbor must
nevertheless be examined for “indicia of express advocacy” to
determine whether it “has an interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified Federal candi‐
date.”180 Drawing on Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opin‐
ion,181 it identifies such indicia as mention of “any election,
candidacy, political party, opposing candidate, or voting by the
general public” or expression of “a position on any candidate’s
or officeholder’s character, qualifications, or fitness for of‐
fice.”182 Content that would support an interpretation other
than as an appeal to vote for or against a candidate includes
focusing on a public policy issue and calling for a candidate to
take a position or for the public to contact the candidate. It may
consist of an ad that “[i]ncludes a call to action or other appeal
that interpreted in conjunction with the rest of the communica‐
tion urges an action other than voting for or against” a candi‐
date.183 Only “the communication itself and basic background
information that may be necessary to put the communication in
context and which can be established with minimal, if any, dis‐
covery” may be considered.184
The FEC “indicia” are easily avoidable—the WRTL ads
avoided them all and so do most issue ads. In the event that the
speaker has not happened upon a current legislative issue,
there does remain room to argue over exactly what constitutes
commentary on a candidate’s “character, fitness, or qualifica‐
tion for office,” but this limitation is not meaningless. The most
straightforward understanding of this phrase would limit it to
comments on a candidate unrelated to issues. But that line is
far from clear. Ads raising the specters of Senator McCain’s
cancer and President Obama’s radical associates may not be

180. 11 C.F.R. § 114.15(c).
181. The principal opinion in WRTL II observed that the ads in question lacked
“indicia of express advocacy.” They did not “mention an election, candidacy,
political party, or challenger; and they do not take a position on a candidate’s
character, qualifications, or fitness for office.” WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 470.
182. 11 C.F.R. § 114.15(b).
183. 11 C.F.R. § 114.15(c)(2)(iii).
184. 11 C.F.R. § 114.15(d). This information may include whether an individual
is a candidate or whether the communication describes a public policy issue. Id.
The rules provide that “any doubt will be resolved in favor of permitting the
communication.” 11 C.F.R. § 114.15(c)(3).
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genuine issue ads.185 What of criticizing a candidate’s relation‐
ship with lobbyists and calling for the reform of ethics stan‐
dards? WRTL II’s protection of issue advocacy would seem to
require some substantial room for discussion of a candidate’s
position on the issues, notwithstanding that objectionable po‐
sitions on the issues could, in some sense, bear on his “fit‐
ness” for office.186
A person who wished to make a case for a more narrow
construction of WRTL II might seize upon WRTL’s ad’s failure
to state Senator Feingold’s position (although it featured the
URL for a website on which that information could be found),
as the principal opinion noted when distinguishing WRTL’s
ad from the hypothetical “Jane Doe” ad discussed in McCon‐
nell.187 Could it be argued that an ad that mentions and then
criticizes a candidate’s position is the functional equivalence
of express advocacy?
But it would be an extraordinarily cramped view of an issue
ad that limited it to calling for advocacy without setting forth
the position of the officeholder to whom that advocacy is to
be directed. It seems reasonable to suspect that citizens will be
far more likely to contact an official who is thought to oppose
the position that they prefer. Outside the context of an elec‐
tion, advocacy organizations, in attempting to rouse support
for or against a particular piece of legislation, typically offer
arguments for their position and identify the position of vari‐
ous legislators and officials.188 Thus, the identification and criti‐
cism of an official’s position does not distinguish “genuine”
from “phony” ads.
185. Although one could argue that the Obama ad calls on him to repudiate
radical ideologies.
186. Responding to a request for an advisory opinion, the FEC deadlocked on
whether proposed ads by the National Right to Life Committee discussing Barack
Obama’s actions with respect to an abortion bill while he was in the Illinois Senate
constituted issue ads. Both ads questioned his honesty and one concluded with
the phrase “Barack Obama: a candidate whose word you can’t believe in.” Alex
Knott, FEC Deadlocks Over Issue Ads, CQ TODAY ONLINE NEWS, Oct. 23, 2008,
http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?parm1=5&docID=news–000002978532.
187. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 470–71 n.6 (2007).
188. Advocacy organizations frequently communicate the positions of elected of‐
ficials—”score cards”—on issues of interest. See, e.g., NARAL Pro Choice Am., 2008
Congressional Record on Choice, http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/files/
2008‐congressional‐record‐on‐choice.pdf; Nat’l Right to Life Comm., NRLC Vote
Scorecard, http://www.capwiz.com/nrlc/home/.
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More fundamentally, the philosophical orientation of WRTL
II’s principal opinion, shared by the concurrence, does not sug‐
gest a narrow reading. Its insistence on the need to resolve all
doubts in favor of speech makes such a reading unlikely.
Nor have post‐WRTL II cases suggested a narrow construc‐
tion. In North Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake (NCRTL III), the
Fourth Circuit upheld a challenge to North Carolina’s two‐
pronged test for express advocacy or its functional equiva‐
lent.189 The court found a variety of infirmities, including lan‐
guage suggesting that speech may be regulated based on how a
“reasonable person” would interpret its “essential nature” in
light of four contextual factors.190
In Center for Individual Freedom, Inc. v. Ireland,191 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
struck down a facial challenge to a statute that provided that a
message may constitute express advocacy if it “‘can only be
interpreted by a reasonable person’ as advocating the election
or defeat of a candidate because ‘the electoral portion’ is clear
and ‘[r]easonable minds could not differ’ as to whether the
message encourages electoral action.”192 This reliance on a pos‐
ited “reasonable person,” in the court’s view, is inconsistent
with WRTL II.193 Although Ireland’s outcome may be better ex‐
plained by the lack of interpretive guidelines in West Virginia’s
statutes,194 Ireland and NCRTL III’s rejection of a standard based
upon how a reasonable person would (as opposed to “could”)
interpret an ad seems consistent with WRTL II’s insistence that
a “tie” go to the speaker.195
Other post‐WRTL II cases provide little guidance. In The Real
Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff’s claims that the FEC’s regulations defining express
advocacy were unconstitutional.196 In Human Life of Washington,
Inc. v. Brumsickle, a district court upheld disclosure require‐

189. 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008).
190. Id. at 280–81.
191. 613 F. Supp. 2d 777 (S.D. W. Va. 2009).
192. Id. at 791.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 474 (2007).
196. 575 F.3d 342, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2009).
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ments on issue advocacy that addressed an issue presented by
a pending referendum.197
The Supreme Court may provide some guidance in Citizens
United v. FEC.198 Citizens United involves application of BCRA’s
restriction on electioneering communications to a film entitled
Hillary: The Movie, produced by a 501(c)(4) organization called
Citizens United.199 The film focused on then‐presidential can‐
didate Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton’s “‘Senate record, her
White House record during President Bill Clinton’s presi‐
dency, . . . her presidential bid,’ and include[d] ‘express opin‐
ions on whether she would make a good president.’”200 Al‐
though display of the film in theatres and distribution by DVD
are outside the scope of BCRA, Citizens United also sought to
make the film available on a “video on demand” cable channel,
and the FEC took the position that the prohibition on broad‐
casting electioneering communications applies.
The district court denied Citizens United’s motion for a pre‐
liminary injunction, finding that the film did not reference leg‐
islative issues, referenced the election and Senator Clinton’s
candidacy, and “[took] a position on her character, qualifica‐
tions, and fitness for office.”201 In the court’s view, the film was
“susceptible of no other interpretation than to inform the elec‐
torate that Senator Clinton is unfit for office, that the United
States would be a dangerous place in a President Hillary Clin‐
ton world, and that viewers should vote against her.”202 Citi‐
zens United appealed directly to the United States Supreme
Court pursuant to section 403(a) of BCRA.203
The Court noted probable jurisdiction and oral argument
was held on March 24, 2009. At oral argument, the government
argued that Congress could, subject to a possible “media ex‐
ception,” constitutionally prohibit the use of corporate funds to
publish or distribute a book containing express advocacy dur‐

197. No. C09‐0590‐JCC, 2009 WL 62144, at *24 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 8, 2009).
198. 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008).
199. Id. at 275.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 279.
202. Id.
203. Jurisdictional statement at 3, Citizens United v. FEC, No. 07‐953 (U.S. Jan.
22, 2008).
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ing the relevant blackout period.204 Although the current BCRA
does not, by its terms, apply to publication of a book, the gov‐
ernment did say that its prohibition could be applied to lengthy
and detailed communications such as Hillary: The Movie, argu‐
ing that a corporation could not, for example, publish or dis‐
tribute a book through satellite transmission to be read on a
Kindle device.205
This argument seemed to trouble the Court. Following ar‐
gument, the Court ordered rehearing and directed the parties
to brief the question of whether Austin’s approval of bans on
the use of corporate treasury funds to support or oppose can‐
didates and McConnell’s approval of a ban on the use of corpo‐
rate or union treasury funds for express advocacy during elec‐
tion season should be overruled or modified.206 The case was
reargued on September 9, 2009, and the Court will likely hand
down a decision soon.207
Should the Court overrule Austin and the pertinent part of
McConnell, the distinction between “express” and “genuine
issue advocacy” would presumably become irrelevant. The
safe harbor would then include not only issue advocacy but
uncoordinated express advocacy. It is also possible that the
Court will modify the earlier cases to limit their reach to for‐
profit corporations.
There are ways for the case to be decided, however, that will
not shed further light on WRTL II. The Court might simply de‐
cide that the statute does not apply to video on demand. Even
if the Court rules for the FEC, it seems likely to do so on the
basis that Hillary: The Movie contains (indeed is apparently
filled with) commentary on Hillary Clinton’s character, qualifi‐
cations, and fitness for office.208 But if the district court’s de‐
scription is accurate, the conclusion that Hillary: The Movie con‐
stitutes the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy seems
unexceptional under McConnell and WRTL II. Given what ap‐
204. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29–30, Citizens United, No. 07‐953 (Mar. 24,
2009), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_tra
nscripts/08‐205.pdf.
205. Id. at 28–29.
206. 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009).
207. Adam Liptak, Justices Are Pressed for a Broad Ruling in Campaign Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009, at A28.
208. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 204, at 11, 20.
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pears to be the discomfort of at least some of the Justices with
application of BCRA’s blackout restriction to things like books
and movies, the Court might choose to expand on the defini‐
tion of “genuine issue advocacy” in a way that makes clear that
some express advocacy (which seems clearly to have been pre‐
sent in the film) cannot justify application of the blackout pe‐
riod to communications which also include substantial issue
advocacy. It seems unlikely, however, that it will retreat from
the broad protection that it announced only two years earlier.209
2.

WRTL II Suggests a Narrow View of the Corruption Interest

WRTL II’s second implication is that the majority unambigu‐
ously dismissed the posited state interests that supported the
outcome in McConnell. That an ad may have been intended to
influence an election and had that effect is insufficient to re‐
strict it on anticorruption grounds, notwithstanding that politi‐
cians will “know who their friends are.” It roundly rejects the
“egalitarian” justification for reform.
This part of the ruling has implications for the public financ‐
ing of elections. A relatively free rein for independent expendi‐
tures makes public financing difficult. Even if some combina‐
tion of campaign restrictions and enhanced funding makes
opting into a system of public financing more attractive than
reliance on private funds, the ability of private money to flow
to independents threatens to swamp the publicly financed mes‐
sages of the candidates. It is unlikely that any politically feasi‐
ble amount of public financing will come close to matching the
flow of independent money to critical races. As noted earlier,
one response to relatively unconstrained independent expendi‐
tures, enacted in various states, is to provide favorable treat‐
ment to candidates facing independent expenditures (or candi‐
dates who abjure public funding and, by self financing or
contributions, exceed certain spending levels). Most simply,
states with public financing systems may provide additional
funds to such candidates.
209. There is also a case moving through the lower courts that raises the ques‐
tion of whether an organization that qualifies as a political committee under fed‐
eral law (because, for example, its major purpose is the nomination and election of
a candidate) can constitutionally be subjected to contribution limits upon its do‐
nors. A district court recently denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary in‐
junction. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 567 F. Supp. 2d 70 (D.D.C. 2008).
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So far, these systems have fared well in the lower courts. In
North Carolina Right to Life Committee Fund for Independent Politi‐
cal Expenditures v. Leake (Leake III), the Fourth Circuit upheld a
state scheme that provided additional funding to certain can‐
didates facing well‐financed, nonparticipating candidates.210
Such a system, in the court’s view, “‘furthers, not abridges, per‐
tinent First Amendment values.’”211 To the extent that nonpar‐
ticipating candidates or independent groups are deterred from
speech, it is a result of “a strategic, political choice, not from a
threat of government censure or prosecution.”212
In Daggett v. Commission on Governmental Ethics and Election
Practices, the First Circuit upheld a similar system in Maine.213
The court declined to “equat[e] responsive speech with an
impairment to the initial speaker”214 and observed that “the
purpose of the First Amendment is to secure the widest pos‐
sible dissemination of information from diverse and antago‐
nistic sources.”215
In Gable v. Patton, the Sixth Circuit upheld a Kentucky
scheme that raised contribution limits for those facing nonpar‐
ticipating candidates who have exceeded the public financing
system limit on expenditures and matched the additional funds
raised on a two for one basis until the expenditure limit was
reached.216 The system was so favorable to participating candi‐
dates that the court could conceive of only a narrow set of cir‐
cumstances in which a candidate would choose not to partici‐
pate (for example, where he intends to exceed the expenditures
limit and believes that he can advance his opportunity by more
than three to one).217 Nevertheless, it upheld the system.218
Prior to last year, only one case had struck down such a sys‐
tem. In Day v. Holahan, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a
Minnesota law that increased a candidate’s expenditure limits
and provided additional public funding in response to inde‐
210. 524 F.3d 427, 432 (4th Cir. 2008).
211. Id. at 436 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92–93 (1976)).
212. Id. at 438.
213. 205 F.3d 445 (1st Cir. 2000).
214. Id. at 465.
215. Id. at 464 (internal quotation marks omitted).
216. 142 F.3d 940, 953 (6th Cir. 1998).
217. Id. at 948.
218. Id. at 953; see also Wilkinson v. Jones, 876 F. Supp. 916 (W.D. Ky. 1995).
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pendent expenditures burdened the speech of those making
the independent expenditures.219
But WRTL II itself suggests a problem. These systems are ex‐
plicitly designed to “equalize” resources (or, at least, to insulate
campaigns from the private distribution of wealth) and to deter
large donors or organized interests from spending money out‐
side the regulated system in an effort to influence elections.
WRTL II suggests that a majority of the current Court does not
believe that such expenditures pose a threat of actual or appar‐
ent corruption. Nor does that majority appear to believe that
regulation of expenditures should seek to “level the playing
field” between candidates and contending political factions—to
prevent, in the words of Cass Sunstein, “disparities in wealth
[from being] translated into disparities in political power.”220
The Court’s attitude poses no threat to public financing itself,
but it may endanger efforts to counter the constitutionally pro‐
tected speech of independent organizations engaging in issue
advocacy or candidates who have opted out of such a scheme
and wish to self finance or to raise and spend larger sums of
money obtained through lawful contributions. What if such
efforts are seen as restrictions or penalties on protected speech?
On what basis might they be justified if the desire to “even the
playing field” is unavailable?
III.

A.

THE PLAYING FIELD IS NOT FLAT: WILL
PUBLIC FINANCING FADE AWAY?

Davis v. FEC: Helping One Side Burdens the Other

Sure enough, yet another mole has sprung up. In Davis v.
FEC, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to BCRA’s
“Millionaire’s Amendment”—a provision that both raised con‐
tribution limits and lifted caps on coordinated party expendi‐
tures for candidates facing a self‐financed candidate with a fi‐
219. 34 F.3d 1356, 1363–66 (8th Cir. 1994). But the Eighth Circuit has upheld a
law that permitted publicly financed candidates to exceed an expenditure ceiling
if their nonparticipating opponents raised funds in excess of a trigger amount. See
Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez, 101 F.3d 1544 (8th Cir. 1996). However, unlike the system
under review in Day, the Rosenstiel scheme provided no additional public funds.
220. Cass Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1390, 1390 (1994).
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nancial advantage exceeding a trigger amount.221 These liberal‐
ized limits were to remain in place until the self‐financed ad‐
vantage had been eliminated.222
The Supreme Court, once again by a 5‐4 vote, held that the
amendment impermissibly burdened the right of a self‐
financing candidate to aggressively advocate his election.223 A
candidate who chooses to exercise that right must “endure the
burden that is placed on that right by the activation of a
scheme of discriminatory contribution limits.”224 This burden
could not, in the view of the majority, be justified by an interest
in avoiding real or apparent corruption.225 Self‐financed candi‐
dates, it reasoned, cannot “corrupt” themselves.226
And that ended the matter. The majority, once again, flatly
rejected the notion that restrictions on speech could be justified
by a desire to “level electoral opportunities for candidates of
different personal wealth.”227 As in WRTL II, this “broader”
definition of corruption or interest in creating a more egalitar‐
ian system of campaign finance was deemed insufficient to sup‐
port the abridgment of speech stemming from asymmetrical
contribution limits. In the view of the majority, only the interest
in the prevention of actual or apparent corruption is compelling:
On the contrary, in Buckley, we held that “[t]he interest in
equalizing the financial resources of candidates” did not
provide a “justification for restricting” candidates’ overall
campaign expenditures, particularly where equalization
“might serve . . . to handicap a candidate who lacked sub‐
stantial name recognition or exposure of his views before the
start of the campaign.” We have similarly held that the in‐
terest “in equalizing the relative ability of individuals and
groups to influence the outcome of elections” cannot sup‐
port a cap on expenditures for “express advocacy of the elec‐
221. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2766 (2008).
222. Essentially the law called for calculation of a number referred to as the “op‐
position personal funds amount” (OPFA) obtained by adding each candidate’s
expenditure of personal funds to 50% of the funds raised from contributors. If one
candidate enjoyed an advantage in excess of $350,000, the asymmetrical limits
would apply to the disadvantaged candidate until the OFPA advantage was
eliminated. Id. at 2766 n.5.
223. Id. at 2774.
224. Id. at 2772.
225. Id. at 2773.
226. Id.
227. Id.
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tion or defeat of candidates,” as “the concept that govern‐
ment may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly for‐
eign to the First Amendment.”228

Such an objective, according to Justice Alito, would have “omi‐
nous implications because it would permit Congress to arro‐
gate the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candi‐
dates competing for office.”229 He continued:
Different candidates have different strengths. Some are
wealthy; others have wealthy supporters who are willing to
make large contributions. Some are celebrities; some have
the benefit of a well‐known family name. Leveling electoral
opportunities means making and implementing judgments
about which strengths should be permitted to contribute to
the outcome of an election. The Constitution, however, con‐
fers upon voters, not Congress, the power to choose the
Members of the House of Representatives, and it is a dan‐
gerous business for Congress to use the election laws to in‐
fluence the voters’ choices.230

Finally, the asymmetrical limitations at issue in Davis could
not be justified to remedy the disadvantage that restrictions on
campaign contributions and coordinated expenditures impose
upon candidates who are not wealthy.231 As in WRTL II, the
Court held that restrictions on protected speech cannot be justi‐
fied by a desire to “mitigate the untoward consequences of
Congress’s own handiwork.”232
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, concurred in part and dissented in part.233 Though only
Justice Stevens would have abandoned Buckley’s distinction of
contributions and expenditures,234 the four dissenters did not
see the asymmetrical limits as a burden on the self‐financing
candidate:

228. Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49, 56–57 (1976)).
229. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773.
230. Id. at 2774 (citations omitted); accord First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978).
231. Id. at 2773–74.
232. Id. at 2774.
233. Id. at 2777 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. Id. at 2777–79.
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The Millionaire’s Amendment quiets no speech at all. On the
contrary, it does no more than assist the opponent of a self‐
funding candidate in his attempts to make his voice heard;
this amplification in no way mutes the voice of the million‐
aire, who remains able to speak as loud and as long as he
likes in support of his campaign. Enhancing the speech of
the millionaire’s opponent, far from contravening the First
Amendment, actually advances its core principles. If only
one candidate can make himself heard, the voter’s ability to
make an informed choice is impaired. And the self‐funding
candidate’s ability to engage meaningfully in the political
process is in no way undermined by this provision.235

The dissenters challenged the majority’s assertion that only
the government’s interest in preventing actual or apparent cor‐
ruption could justify such a regulation.
Indeed, we have long recognized the strength of an inde‐
pendent governmental interest in reducing both the influ‐
ence of wealth on the outcomes of elections, and the appear‐
ance that wealth alone dictates those results. In case after
case, we have held that statutes designed to protect against
the undue influence of aggregations of wealth on the politi‐
cal process—where such statutes are responsive to the iden‐
tified evil—do not contravene the First Amendment.236

“Although,” the dissent continued, “the focus of our cases
has been on aggregations of corporate rather than individual
wealth, there is no reason that their logic—specifically, their
concerns about the corrosive and distorting effects of wealth on
our political process—is not equally applicable in the context of
individual wealth.”237
B.

The Implications of Davis and WRTL II

If WRTL II ensures the continued vitality of independent ex‐
penditures, Davis seems to limit the potential for regulatory
response. It suggests that aiding the opposition is a burden on
protected speech that cannot be justified by a desire to reduce
the influence of money and to level the playing field. If that is
so, asymmetrical schemes of public financing that provide ad‐

235. Id. at 2780. (citation omitted).
236. Id. at 2781.
237. Id.
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ditional funding or raise contribution limits in response to in‐
dependent expenditures are presumably unconstitutional.
In response to a blog post in which I initially set forth the
argument developed here,238 a case comment in the Harvard
Law Review argues that asymmetrical funding can be saved by
the distinction between government subsidies and penal‐
ties.239 At least under certain circumstances, the government
can fund speech without also funding analogous speech. It
can, for example, fund only family planning clinics that do
not counsel patients about abortion.240 It can consider “general
standards of decency” in making grants to artists241 and forbid
nonprofits that engage in lobbying from receiving tax de‐
ductible contributions.242
In the view of the Harvard author, the government can also
choose to provide additional funding to those candidates who
face substantial independent expenditures.243 Davis, according
to the author, involves a government restriction on speech, that
is, the lower (actually unchanged) campaign contribution limits
applicable to candidates choosing to self‐finance above a cer‐
tain level.244 Asymmetrical financing, the comment argues, is
not a restriction, but a subsidy that enhances the “speech
power” of a candidate who must contend with a self‐financing
opponent.245 The Harvard author argues that Justice Alito,
given his self‐professed judicial modesty, could not have meant
to discard, sub silentio, the distinction between subsidies and
penalties and its “clear doctrinal line” between asymmetrical
restrictions and asymmetrical funding.246
It certainly is the case that, subject to certain limitations and
under certain circumstances, the government can pick and
238. Shark and Shepherd, http://sharkandshepherd.blogspot.com (June 26,
2008, 13:22 EDT). The same argument was suggested on the same day (several
hours earlier) by Rick Hasen at the Election Law Blog. Election Law Blog,
http://electionlawblog.org/ (June 26, 2008, 7:55 EDT).
239. The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 375–76
(2008).
240. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
241. Nat’l. Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
242. Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
243. The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, supra note 239, at 381.
244. Id. at 383–84.
245. Id. at 384.
246. Id.
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choose what speech it will subsidize. It is also the case that
courts have upheld the decision not to fund the expression of
certain points of view. The Supreme Court has, from time to
time, used the language of penalty and subsidy to characterize
prohibited and permitted government responses to private
speech. It is not the case that the distinction between penalties
and subsidies—a branch of the law of unconstitutional condi‐
tions247—is readily discerned or consistently applied.248 It is, in
fact, one of the most confusing areas of First Amendment law249
and certainly cannot be navigated by the application of labels.250
The language of penalty and subsidy is not itself very helpful
here. Both were present in Davis and are present in a system of
asymmetrical public financing. In Davis, one could, with the
majority, characterize the Millionaire’s Amendment as a pen‐
alty on those who exercise their constitutionally protected right
to self finance. Relaxing contribution restrictions for one’s op‐
ponent will certainly be perceived as a penalty and it is well
within our customary uses of language to call it such.251
But one might also, with the minority, characterize it as an
attempt to promote (if not exactly subsidize) the speech of
those faced by self‐financed candidates. Indeed, Justice Ste‐
vens’s position in dissent was that Davis did no more than em‐
power responsive speech, that is, enable “speech power.”252
Similarly, while one can see the government subsidy cases as
selective “empowerment” of only certain types of speech, that
247. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1413, 1420 (1989) (“Neither the Court nor the commentary . . . has developed a
satisfying theory of what is coercive about unconstitutional conditions.”).
248. See Cass R. Sunstein, Why the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine Is an
Anachronism (With Particular Reference to Religion, Speech, and Abortion), 70 B.U. L.
REV. 593 (1990) (citing cases in which the Court inexplicitly opted not to employ
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
249. Martin H. Redish & Daryl I. Kessler, Government Subsidies and Free Expres‐
sion, 80 MINN. L. REV. 543, 546 (1996) (proposing a complicated framework that
distinguishes negative and positive subsidies; positive subsidies that are “policy”
and “auxiliary;” auxiliary subsidies that are “categorical,” “viewpoint–based,” or
subsidies of “judgmental necessity”).
250. Cass R. Sunstein, Half Truths of the First Amendment, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
25, 39–40 (arguing that the distinction between penalties and subsidies “forces us
to chase ghosts” and is irrelevant).
251. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413,
1420 (1989) (“Conclusory labels often take the place of analysis.”).
252. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2780 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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is, as a subsidy, it is just as easy to call it a penalty. The family
planning clinic that wishes to provide information about abor‐
tion must forego government funding as a condition of doing
so. A nonprofit loses its tax exemption for exercising its right to
lobby its elected representatives. Referring to something as a
“penalty” or a “subsidy” is an interpretive choice that is not
guided by the terms themselves.
Although this distinction could be made to turn on whether
government cuts a check, that seems overly formalistic and, in
any event, inconsistent with the precedent. Loss of a tax de‐
ductible contribution because of lobbying is not the receipt of
funds but, as in Davis, the imposition of a more onerous set of
rules impacting the solicitation of funds.
The language of penalty and subsidy is a way of characteriz‐
ing the impact of a selective subsidy or a different set of rules
on the disfavored party. Thus, although a speaker has no right
to government largesse (subsidy), he does have the right to be
free from undue interference (penalty). Whether one calls a
regulatory scheme a more attractive set of limitations or a di‐
rect subsidy is not the critical question. What is important is a
judgment about the way in which a government action impacts
protected speech, and that judgment must now be understood
in light of Davis.
The problem in Davis—and it is also present in an asymmet‐
rical financing system—is that an election is, in the words of
Justice Stevens, a “zero‐sum” game.253 This characterization is
not true—at least not in the same way—in the government
subsidy cases. The loss of a tax exemption for lobbying applies
equally to, say, Wisconsin Right to Life and Planned Parent‐
hood. Although one might argue that funding family planning
clinics that do not provide information about abortion or sub‐
sidizing art that is not transgressive “burdens” those who wish
to provide abortion information or lay bare the horror of con‐
ventional values, the harm is quite indirect. In an election, what
helps one side directly and immediately harms the other. The
subsidy to an opponent necessarily burdens the speaker.
Thus, Davis regarded the benefit (higher contribution limits
and unlimited coordinated expenditures) as “an unprece‐
dented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises [his or
253. Id.
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her] First Amendment right”254 because increased contribution
limits for one’s opponent constitutes a “special and potentially
significant burden.”255 Significantly, the Court cited Day v.
Holahan, the only case striking down asymmetrical public fi‐
nancing and expenditure limits, in support of that position.256
The burden, it explained, was that “the vigorous exercise of the
right to use personal funds to finance campaign speech pro‐
duces fundraising advantages for opponents in the competitive
context of electoral politics.”257 Rather than justifying the bur‐
den, the effort to “level the playing field” by assisting a candi‐
date who opposed the speaker’s position is the burden.
It is triggered, moreover, by the decision to speak. It is not the
decision to provide information on abortion that causes a sub‐
sidy to be provided to another clinic that does not wish to do so.
Although the loss of the tax deduction subsidy for an organiza‐
tion’s donors does turn on the choice to speak (that is, to lobby),
it does not do so in a way that impairs the “speech power” of the
speaker relative to opposing points of view (although it does
make it more difficult to raise money for other purposes, some
of which might include speech). Particularly in the context of an
election, the effect and intent of such a scheme is to dissuade
constitutionally protected speech and to do so in a way that the
Davis majority regarded with extreme skepticism.
The latter point is also critical. After WRTL II and Davis, the
Court is unlikely to apply a linguistic distinction between sub‐
sidies and penalties apart from consideration of their impact on
the election context and a distrust of the ability of incumbent
politicians to neutrally regulate the political process. The “sub‐
sidy” that is provided (or the “penalty” that is imposed) does so
in a context that is ripe for mischief and self‐dealing. The rules
that silence election speech are drawn by the incumbents who
will then get to play by them to win reelection. As the Davis
court noted, it is “dangerous business” to allow elected officials
to act to minimize some electoral advantages and not others.258
A better argument might distinguish Davis by arguing that
the constitutionally protected right is to speak on issues and
254. Id. at 2771 (Alito, J., majority opinion).
255. Id. at 2772.
256. Id.; see supra note 219.
257. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2772.
258. Id. at 2774.

326

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 33

that the additional subsidy would be provided to a targeted
candidate and not to some individual or organization seeking
to present the opposing view on the pertinent issue. One could
argue that the burden on the speaker is an “indirect” burden in
a way that the burden imposed by the Millionaire’s Amend‐
ment is not. Asymmetrical public financing or “rescue” fund‐
ing does not necessarily pay for a message advocating the op‐
posing position on the pertinent issue (although it might) but
only for a message supporting the candidate who the issue ad‐
vocacy is seeking to persuade.
But that would seem to exalt form over substance. The pro‐
tected interest does not simply involve communication di‐
rected to the targeted candidate but to the public at large as
well. The burden on the constitutionally protected right of the
advocacy organization is clear. If it chooses to speak, the gov‐
ernment will give money to a candidate who opposes what it
supports. Whether one characterizes this as “direct” or “indi‐
rect” seems wholly beside the point. The burden is real and
substantial. As the Eighth Circuit noted in Day:
[T]he knowledge that a candidate who one does not want to
be elected will have her spending limits increased and will
receive a public subsidy equal to half the amount of the in‐
dependent expenditure, as a direct result of that independ‐
ent expenditure, chills the free exercise of that protected
speech.259

One might also argue that the state interest in regulating the
impact of independent expenditures is stronger than its interest
in limiting the advantages of a self‐financed candidate. Pre‐
sumably, a candidate will not be beholden to himself for part‐
ing with some of his own fortune in seeking public office (al‐
though he may be partial to those interests and policies that he
perceived to have helped him accumulate and maintain it), but
it is hardly unreasonable to think that a candidate will perceive
a need to remain on friendly terms with those who supported
his election and who may attempt to wield similar influence in
future campaigns.
There is much that could be asked about whether this is, in
fact, the way in which the political world really works. It is un‐
clear, for example, that interested parties support candidates
259. Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1360 (8th Cir. 1994).
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whose views are tabula rasa, up for auction to whoever offers
the most support. Interested parties may well prefer to invest
in candidates who hold views that they feel are conducive to
their interests.260
It is unclear, moreover, whether the provision of additional
funding materially reduces the threat of actual or apparent cor‐
ruption. Providing funds to one’s opponent does not, after all,
change whatever dependence the candidate benefitting from
independent expenditures has upon those who financed them.
The potentially corrupting influence of these expenditures will
be eliminated only if the provision of matching funds or
asymmetrical contribution limits dissuades them from being
made, and that is precisely the effect that Davis found to be
constitutionally problematic.
More fundamentally, this argument rests precisely on the in‐
terest that was rejected in WRTL II. The possibility of gratitude,
as opposed to a quid pro quo, was not enough to justify the re‐
striction of speech. For the five Justices concurring in the result
in WRTL II, uncoordinated independent expenditures—at least
as long as they can be interpreted to be issue advocacy—do not
create a threat of actual or apparent corruption sufficiently
strong to warrant BCRA’s restrictions on constitutionally re‐
stricted speech.261
Asymmetrical financing schemes have also been upheld as
efforts to encourage candidates to participate in systems of pub‐
lic financing.262 On this view, a state might offer additional help
(or relaxed restrictions) to candidates who agree to abide by
whatever limitations opting into the system of public financing
entails. If public financing is seen as a response to actual or ap‐
parent corruption, then protecting candidates who opt in from
being swamped by independent expenditures might further
that end. But that interest—that is, avoiding actual or apparent
corruption—is apparently not enough to justify the restriction
of genuine issue ads. If that is so, it is difficult to see why the

260. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394–95 (2000) (citing con‐
flicting studies).
261. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).
262. See, e.g., Gable v. Patton, 142 F.3d 940, 953 (6th Cir. 1998); Rosenstiel v. Rod‐
riguez, 101 F.3d 1544, 1546 (8th Cir. 1996).

328

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 33

encouragement of public financing—which is only a means
rather than the end—adds anything to the state’s interest.263
IV.

LETTING THE MOLES GO: WRTL II AND
DAVIS AS CAUSE FOR RELIEF

Given the sharp division on the Court and the possibility for
changes in its composition, it may be that we will see the Court
abandon WRTL II’s rejection (repeated in Davis) of an egalitar‐
ian rationale for reform and its expansive protection for indi‐
vidual expenditures. Perhaps it will retreat from Davis’s treat‐
ment of efforts to achieve equality by providing financial
benefits to a candidate who faces an opponent who has ob‐
tained a disfavored form of financial advantage. But Davis and
WRTL II suggest that it may be time to abandon our genera‐
tion‐long game of Whac‐A‐Mole.
Certainly, reasonable regulation of campaign finance is ap‐
propriate, but the more ambitious manifestations of reform
seek to improve participatory democracy in a way suggested
by Justice Breyer in his recent book, Active Liberty. Justice
Breyer argues for an interpretive hermeneutic that is informed
by what he believes to be the Constitution’s democratic na‐
ture264 and rooted in what he calls the “liberty of the ancients,”
that is, the participatory self‐government evoked by the citi‐
zens of ancient Athens.265 In the context of campaign finance
reform, the idea is to act in a way that removes the presumed
improper interference of wealth and to “facilitate a conversa‐
tion among ordinary citizens that will encourage their in‐
formed participation in the electoral process.”266 Limiting the
influence of money is presumed to build public confidence in
the process, broaden the base of a candidate’s financial sup‐
port, and encourage “greater public participation.”267 It will,

263. Shortly before the fall 2008 election, a district judge in Arizona found that a
challenge to Arizona’s asymmetrical public financing scheme had a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits but declined to enjoin its enforcement due to
the short period of time before the election. McComish v. Brewer, No. CV‐08‐
1550‐PHX‐ROS, 2008 WL 4629337 (D. Ariz. Oct. 17, 2008).
264. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 46 (2005).
265. Id. at 5.
266. Id. at 46.
267. Id. at 47.
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the argument continues, help to ensure that a candidate’s fi‐
nancial support more closely reflects his popular support.
A full consideration of this objective is beyond the scope of
this Article. But there are, I think, three fatal problems with the
project of campaign finance egalitarianism and the search for
“barometric” equality. The first is the improbability, if not im‐
possibility, of success. It is hardly surprising that the collective
public body is willing to spend hundreds of millions of dollars
to influence a government that spends trillions. In fact, the
money spent on political advertising remains a fraction of what
is spent on advertising movies, automobiles, and beer along
with other products and services.268 Given the stakes, it seems
unlikely that regulators will be able to stop money, like water,
from seeking its own level. Even if, for example, reform effec‐
tively prevented donors from purchasing paid media, it could
not prevent them from purchasing the media outlets them‐
selves. Although current doctrine arguably permits regulation
of broadcast outlets,269 emerging technologies have multiplied
the ways in which messages can be delivered.
Even if the flow of money could be stemmed, it is unlikely
that it will be done in a way that furthers the objectives of some
presumably pure form of participatory democracy. There are at
least two stumbling blocks. As the Court in Davis observed,270
different candidates have a variety of different advantages.
Many are wholly unrelated to the participation of the citizenry
in an open public conversation and exchange of ideas. Elimi‐
nating some and not others will benefit certain candidates at
the expense of others. Removing the advantage of those who
can attract wealthy donors benefits incumbents whose advan‐
tage lies not only in their existing name recognition, but also in
their ability to use the resources of the state and the guise of

268. The size of the advertising industry in the United States was estimated
to be over $150 billion in 2007. Press Release, TNS Media Intelligence, TNS
Media Intelligence Forecasts 2.6 Percent Increase in U.S. Advertising Spending
for 2007 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at http://www.tns–mi.com/news/01082007.htm.
Spending on political advertising in 2008 has been estimated at $2.6 billion. Post‐
ing of Katharine Q. Seelye to The Caucus, http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com
(Dec. 2, 2008, 16:15 EST).
269. See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
270. Davis v. FEC, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774 (2008).
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“communicating” with constituents271 to enhance their own
electoral prospects and shape public opinion.
Reduction of the influence of those who wish to financially
support candidates will benefit celebrities and those who al‐
ready have access to the public. It will enhance the power of
the media and what John McGinnis calls the “scribal class.”272 It
may enhance the prospects of candidates further to the left or
the right who can attract larger numbers of small donors if, as
seems plausible, it turns out that the ideologically committed
are more likely to contribute. It may help those in a position to
attract the endorsement of large membership organizations—
such as unions—whose members are likely to follow the cue of
their leadership.
We cannot eliminate all of these advantages to attain a public
conversation unsullied by confounding elements unrelated to
the collective deliberation regarding candidates’ ideas and quali‐
fications. There is, in fact, no public conversation and no prior
distribution of support apart from these confounding elements.
Of course, wishing for the perfect should not be the enemy of
achieving the good. But there is another stumbling block on the
way to Athenian democracy. As the majority in Davis empha‐
sized, campaign finance rules are not set by disinterested per‐
sons.273 It is incumbents, acting on an arcane and technical
topic, who fashion the rules that will govern the process by
which they will seek to retain their offices. It takes a rather
sunny view of human nature to remain sanguine about the
manner in which they will undertake that task.274
Finally, it is not clear that restricting the speech of groups
thought to be spending “too much” money is consistent with
271. Although we frequently hear reference to “phony” or “sham” issue ads, we
less often hear of “sham newsletters” distributed through the congressional frank‐
ing privilege.
272. John O. McGinnis, Against the Scribes: Campaign Finance Reform Revisited, 24
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 27–28 (2000) (referring to the press, academia, and the
entertainment industry).
273. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2774.
274. In fact, one commenter has suggested that Justice Breyer’s position repre‐
sents a Pelagian view of our Augustinian Constitution. William E. Thro, A Pela‐
gian Vision For Our Augustinian Constitution: A Review of Justice Breyer’s Active
Liberty, 12 J.C. & U.L. 491, 491–92 (2006). Pelagius was a fifth‐century British
monk who taught that humanity was inherently virtuous and that individuals
could achieve their own salvation. Augustine taught that individuals are fallen
and can achieve salvation only through the grace of God. Id. at 491.
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democratic principles. One of the purposes of efforts to reduce
the role of money in politics is to bolster populism. But, of
course, the most successful populists are those who can use the
coercive authority of the state to deliver benefits to a working
majority. It is not clear why tipping the balance toward the ma‐
jority is more legitimate than the ex ante allocation of resources.
There is a great danger to democracy from the majority’s
temptation to serve their self interest at the expense of the mi‐
nority. In the absence of robust constitutional protection for
property rights and economic liberty, the ability of the pros‐
perous minorities to be heard (as opposed to buying politicians
through contributions) may be one way in which populism is
prevented from descending into demagoguery.275
The wealthy, as Judge Richard Posner argues, are “not a
monolith” and, in any event, “lack the votes.”276 Wealthy do‐
nors must craft messages that appeal to the masses and, if those
messages provoke or call for a populist response, other candi‐
dates will seek to raise money from the much larger pool of
nonwealthy small donors.277
Another way to achieve the good and not the perfect is the
Madisonian notion of allowing factions to check each other. As
explained in Federalist No. 10, the triumph of the private interest
over the public good—of partiality over justice—might well in‐
clude the tyranny of the majority: “The apportionment of taxes
on the various descriptions of property” provides the “opportu‐
nity and temptation . . . [for] a predominant party[] to trample
on the rules of justice” because “[e]very shilling with which they
over‐burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own
pockets.”278 The “causes of faction,”—defined as contending par‐
ties often driven by self interest—“cannot be removed; and [so]
relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.”279

275. Cf. McGinnis, supra note 272, at 29–30 (citing MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND
PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 15–16
(2000)) (suggesting that “societies grow faster and have less conflict when the
political power is diffused throughout . . . those involved in producing the social
surplus of society”).
276. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 331 (2008).
277. Id.
278. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 51 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
279. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Madison despaired of the notion that “enlightened statesmen”
would choose the public over the private interest.280 For Madi‐
son, if factions could not be eliminated, the contending interests,
through competition, may come to check one another. Applied
here, the idea is that candidates may benefit from a variety of
advantages that we may regard as more or less legitimate.
Rather than trusting interested parties to choose among them,
we are better served by regulation with a lighter hand.
The Internet has made the latter approach far more effective,
as demonstrated by the fundraising success of President Barack
Obama.281 Given the success of Internet fundraising, it may in‐
creasingly be the case that small money counters big money.282
Although allowing competition between initially unequal par‐
ties seems unlikely to result in a world where the distribution
of contributions and expenditures reflects some presumed dis‐
tribution of public opinion or one in which the wealthy will not
give more than the nonwealthy, the “distorting” impact of
wealth may turn out to be less than feared.
CONCLUSION
The Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence may be a bit
like the weather in my home state of Delaware. If you do not
like it, the saying goes, just wait. But the principles underlying
WRTL II and Davis have a longstanding pedigree in that juris‐
prudence. Expenditures differ from contributions. It is not the
role of the state to level the political playing field. Recognizing
the implication of these principles may remind us that democ‐
racy may be better served by competition than by control.

280. Id.
281. But see CAMPAIGN FIN. INST., REALITY CHECK: OBAMA RECEIVED ABOUT THE
SAME PERCENTAGE FROM SMALL DONORS IN 2008 AS BUSH IN 2004 (2008),
http://www.cfinst.org/pr/prRelease.aspx?ReleaseID=216 (finding that, although
49% of Obama’s contributions were $200 or less, only 26% came from donors who
gave less than $200 in the aggregate).
282. Richard L. Hasen, Political Equality, the Internet, and Campaign Finance
Regulation, 6(1) THE FORUM art. 7 (2008), available at http://www.bepress.com/
forum/vol6/iss1/art7/.

